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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

CPLR 7503(a): Service of an application to compel arbitrationupon
an attorney by mail is proper if an action is already pending.
In Olsen & Chapman Construction Co. v. Village of Cazenovia,200
a contractor sought a declaratory judgment as to whether certain items
constituted additional work under the terms of his contract. The defendant thereupon moved to compel arbitration by mailing an order to
show cause to the plaintiff's attorney. Since the application to compel
arbitration was made within a pending action, the court ruled that this
mode of service 201 was proper.
Inasmuch as arbitration is no longer deemed a special proceeding,20 2 a great deal of confusion surrounds the service of the first
application arising out of the arbitrable controversy. 20 3 Indeed, this
initiatory-interlocutory papers distinction has received continuous attention in the Survey.204 If an action is not pending when the first
application is made, jurisdiction over the defendant must be acquired.
Hence, exacting compliance with the service requirements of the
CPLR 2 5 is mandated. 20 6 However, when an action has already been
commenced, the first application is classified a motion.20 7 Therefore, as
illustrated by Olsen, resort to the rules governing the service of motion
papers is undoubtedly proper.20 8
CPLR 7503(c): Ten-day statute of limitations is satisfied by posting
papers by certified mail on tenth day after receipt of a notice of intention to arbitrate.
Under CPLR 7503(c), the recipient of a properly drafted notice
of intention to arbitrate 20 9 must apply to stay arbitration within ten
200 33

App. Div. 2d 929, 306 N.Y.S.2d 560 (3d Dep't 1970).
201 Service of an order to show cause in lieu of a notice of motion is authorized by
CPLR 2214. Service by mail upon an attorney is authorized by CPLR 2103.
202 Compare CPA 1458 with CPLR 7502(a).
203 CPLR 7502(a) provides: "A special proceeding shall be used to bring before a
court the first application arising out of an arbitrable controversy which is not made by
motion in a pending action."
204 See, e.g., The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. Rv. 760, 158, 157 (1969); The
Quarterly Survey, 43 ST. JoHN'S L. REv. 532, 344, 70 (1968).
205 CPLR 304
206 See, e.g., Graffagnino v. MVAIC, 48 Misc. 2d 441, 264 N.YS.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1963).
207 CPLR 7502(a).
208 In addition to service by mail upon an attorney, the three-day extension authorized by CPLR 2103(b) would be available.
209 The notice of intention to arbitrate must contain the name and address of the
claimant and must specify the agreement pursuant to which arbitration is sought. Also,
notice must be given the recipient that unless an application is made within ten days
after such service, he will be precluded from raising the "threshold" questions. CPLR

7503(c).
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days. Otherwise, he is thereafter precluded from asserting that a valid
agreement had not been made or complied with.210 This ten-day caveat
is not mere precatory language.2 1 1 In effect, it constitutes a very short
statute of limitations 2 2 in that instance wherein it is necessary to commence a special proceeding, i.e., if an action is not already pending. 213
To date, a frequent question surrounding the interpretation of
CPLR 7503(c) has been when the ten-day period begins to run.214 Re-

cently, however, in Glens Falls Insurance Co. v. Anness, 215 the Supreme
Court, New York County, was confronted with the problem of determining the final date on which a "timely" application for a stay of
arbitration could be received.
In Glens Falls, the moving papers for a stay of arbitration were
posted by certified mail, return receipt requested, on the tenth day
following the receipt of a notice of intention to arbitrate, but were
not delivered until several days later. In response to the contention
that service was untimely, the court held that service was effected on
the date of posting -not the date of actual receipt.
The decision in Glens Falls was motivated by a number of practical considerations as well as the logical discernment of legislative
intent. As recognized by the court, the party demanding arbitration
may have several months to prepare and serve his papers. In addition,
an objection to his opponent's subsequent application for a stay of arbitration is styled a motion; hence, the period of time in which to
respond can be enlarged. 210 On the other hand, the recipient of a notice of intention to arbitrate is denied the time extensions afforded by

21
CPLR 2004217 and 2103(b). 218 Thus, in accord with previous decisions,

9

210 The third "threshold question," whether the arbitration is barred by a limitation
of time may be presented to the arbitrator, but he may refuse to consider it. CPLR

7502(b).

211 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 7503(c), supp. commentary at 123 (1967).
212 See Jonathan Logan, Inc. v. Stillwater Worsted Mills, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 898, 249
N.E2d 477, 301 N.Y.S.2d 636 (1969).
213 CPLR 7502(a): "A special proceeding shall be used to bring before a court the
first application arising out of an arbitrable controversy which is not made by motion
in a pending action."
214 See, e.g., Finest Restaurant Corp. v. L&A Music Co., 52 Misc. 2d 87, 275 N.YS.2d 1
(Sup Ct. N.Y. County 1966); Beverly Cocktail Lounge, Inc. v. Emerald Vending Mach.,
Inc., 45 Misc. 2d 376, 256 N.Y.S.2d 812 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1965).
215 62 Misc. 2d 592, 308 N.Y.S.2d 893 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1970).
216

CPLR 2004.

217 Jonathan Logan, Inc. v. Stillwater Worsted Mills, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 898, 249 N.E.2d
477, 301 N.Y.S.2d 636 (1969).
218 Beverly Cocktail Lounge, Inc. v. Emerald Vending Mach., Inc., 45 Misc. 2d 376,
256 N.Y.S.2d 812 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1965).
219 See Finest Restaurant Corp. v. I&A Music Co., 52 Misc. 2d 87, 275 N.Y.S.2d 1
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1966).
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the court concluded that if the ten-day period is indeed a statute of
limitations, a party must be given a full ten days in which to apply for
a stay of arbitration.
A contrary decision would presumably frustrate the purpose of
permitting service by certified mail. For, to insure timely receipt, a
party would often be compelled to post his moving papers at least
three days before the ten-day period expired. Or, service by mail would
be abandoned in favor of personal delivery.
CPLR 7511(b)(1Xiii): Court of Appeals establishes criteria for determining whether arbitratorhas exceeded his powers.
In marked contrast to earlier hostility,220 courts have demonstrated

an extreme reluctance to interfere with the arbitral process,221 except
to scrutinize the arbitration agreement itself.2 22 Recognizing the con-

tractual right of parties to choose arbitration as the proper forum in
which to settle their disputes,

22 3

thereby waiving the substantive and

22 4

procedural law of the state, courts have been similarly hesitant in
vacating an arbitrator's award.22 5 Indeed, it is generally accepted that
226
The CPLR
an award cannot be vacated for errors of law or fact.

reflects this approach inasmuch as the grounds for vacating an award
focus primarily on the integrity of the participants227 and the arbitrator,22 8 rather than on the wisdom of the award. Even CPLR 7511
(b)(1)(iii), which provides for vacation if the arbitrator has exceeded
his power, has been emasculated by an earlier decision that to fall
within the ambit of this subsection, a contract must be given an irrational construction by the arbitrator: one that, in effect, makes a new
contract for the parties.

229

Quite surprising, therefore, is the Court of

Appeals' decision vacating an arbitrator's award in Granite Worsted
Mills v. Aaronson Cowen, Ltd.2 30
7501.01.
220 See 8 WK&M
221 See, e.g., Astoria Medical Group v. Health Ins. Plan, 11 N.Y.2d 128, 182 N.E.2d 85,
227 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1962).
222For a discussion of the "threshold questions," i.e., those to be decided by the
court, see 7B McKINNFY'S CPLR 7503, commentary at 488-89 (1963).
223 Astoria Medical Group v. Health Ins. Plan, 11 N.Y.2d 128, 182 NE.2d 85, 227
N.Y.S.2d 401 (1962).
224 Spectrum Fabrics Corp. v. Main St. Fashions, 285 App. Div. 710, 139 N.Y.S.2d 612
(Ist Dep't 1955).
225 See, e.g., Torano v. MVAIC, 15 N.Y.2d 882, 206 N.E.2d 353, 258 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1965).
226 Wilkins v. Allen, 169 N.Y. 494, 62 N.E. 575 (1902).
227 CPLR 7511(b)(1)(i): "corruption, fraud or misconduct in procuring the award."
228 CPLR 7511(b)(1)(ii): "partiality of an arbitrator appointed as a neutral."
229 National Cash Register Co. v. Wilson, 8 N.Y.2d 377, 171 N.E2d 302, 208
N.Y.S.2d 951 (1960).
23025 N.Y.2d 451, 255 N.E2d 168, 306 N.Y.S.2d 934 (1969), rev'g 29 App. Div. 2d
503, 287 N.Y.S.2d 765 (1st Dep't 1968).

